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ABSTRACT
A challenge is to develop cyber-physical system scenarios that
reflect the diversity and complexity of real-life cyber-physical sys-
tems in the research questions that they address. Time-bounded
collaborative events, such as hackathons, jams and sprints, are
increasingly used as a means of bringing groups of individuals to-
gether, in order to explore challenges and develop solutions. This
paper describes our experiences, using a science hackathon to bring
individual researchers together, in order to develop a common use-
case implemented on a shared CPS testbed platform that embodies
the diversity in their own security research questions. A qualitative
study of the event was conducted, in order to evaluate the success
of the process, with a view to improving future similar events.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems; • Security and privacy → Security in hard-
ware; • Software and its engineering → Software development
process management;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Securing Cyber-physical systems (CPS) is non-trivial, requiring
techniques and understanding that span a variety of computational
and physical components. It is often this diversity that is exploited
by attackers: a siloing of expertise on the part of researchers and/or
developers can mean that vulnerabilities are overlooked, introduced
or interoperate in ways that are not anticipated [14]. CPS testbeds
provide platforms that can help understand and investigate research
on security techniques, and testbeds that reflect the diversity of
CPS components have an important role to play [1, 8]. However,
construction and maintenance of ‘real-life’ testbeds requires exper-
tise [8, 12] which, along with potentially high capital and recurrent
costs, may deter their use in research.
Sharing research equipment among research groups is one course
of action. This is more than just sharing infrastructure, it is also
about pooling expertise and collaboration. The challenge is how to
enable this research using shared CPS platforms.
In this paperwe consider how time-bounded collaborative events,
centred around shared CPS testbed platforms, can be used to enable
security research. These events [4], such as hackathons, jams and
sprints, are increasingly used as a means to bring groups of indi-
viduals together, to explore challenges and develop solutions. The
primary contribution of this paper is a methodology for a science
hackathon used to develop a common use-case using shared CPS
testbed equipment. In addition to providing a ‘real-life’ CPS infras-
tructure, the use-case supports diversity in the research questions
it addresses. This is achieved by drawing together security research
from a number of individual projects, including diagnostics, re-
silience, visualization and anomaly detection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some re-
lated work on time-bounded collaborative events and CPS testbed
platforms. Section 3 proposes the use of transverse use-cases on
shared CPS testbed platforms as a means of supporting diverse re-
search questions. Section 4 proposes the use of a science hackathon
as a means to develop transverse use-cases and Section 5 describes
a CPS testbed platform that was developed following this process.
A qualitative study on the experience of this activity, described in
Section 6, has been used to evaluate the process. Section 7 provides
discussion and conclusion.
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2 RELATEDWORK
There is a good deal of published literature on time-bounded collab-
orative events, ranging from academic studies of public hackathons
[16] to accounts by practitioners of their own experiences [6, 9].
An ongoing theme is the tension between the pressures to pro-
duce artefacts versus the idealised notion of a hackathon as a free-
wheeling melting pot of creativity, ideas, and skills. In an ethno-
graphic study of how participants organise themselves and their
development practices, Richterich [16] found that the pressures to
produce artifacts can skew the activity away from personal learning
and technical depth. On the other hand, Frey et. al. [6] consider how
organisational structures can slow innovation and describe their
practical experiences of using hackathons as a means to facilitate
innovation within the organisation.
The time-bounded event described in this paper is closest, in
sentiment, to the science hackathon [9] which exposes researchers
to new research challenges and helps them to develop their own re-
search ideaswithin a broader research landscape. Science hackathons
are time-bounded collaborative events where a group of researchers
come together to identify research challenges and ‘hack’ new lines
of research. A case in point is the science jam at the ACM Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, with the objective
to enable small groups of individuals to research, and develop a
research poster within a two day timeframe.
Contemporary hackathons that focus on CPS and IoT develop-
ment are becoming common, although we are not aware of their
use in a scientific context for CPS research. Wagner [18] discusses
how the Scrum agile methodology might be adapted in the context
of a design-sprint for CPS systems, although it has not been tried in
practice. Taha et. al. [17] describe an agile development of an open-
source CPS testbed that is intended for research and education, and
supports simulation and verification of continuous and discrete
CPS models. Our transverse use-cases go beyond simulation, with
an emphasis on working with real-life infrastructure and platforms,
concurring with Green et. al. [8] who highlight that in real-life,
CPS infrastructures, such as Industrial Control Systems, comprise
a wide range of different equipment and that research testbeds
should reflect this diversity. This emphasis of dealing with real-life
infrastructure and equipment for training and research is also seen
in the development of Capture the Flag style gamification of an
ICS testbed platform [1, 7]. The activity described in this paper is
not a conventional competitive hackathon; as a combination of jam
and hackathon, it emphasises hacking CPS platforms as a means to
integrate, demonstrate and explore lines of research.
3 TRANSVERSE USE CASES
The Cyber CNI Chair is an Institut Mines Télécom (IMT) industry
chair on the cyber-security of Critical National Infrastructure with
an emphasis on security of cyber-physical systems. A collaboration
between three geographically dispersed IMT schools and eight in-
dustry partners, targeted industry use-cases form an important part
of the research activity of each doctoral/post-doctoral researcher.
With over fifty academic and industry researchers and investiga-
tors working together on ten separate, although related, targeted
projects, there is a risk that these research efforts become siloed, if
not by project, then by school. Furthermore, Intellectual Property
(IP) constraints surrounding an industry target use-case may make
it difficult to share the results within the chair or to the broader
scientific community. Foreground research results may become
intertwined with commercially sensitive target use-case technol-
ogy/background IP that an industry partner wishes to protect.
Building on the research activities across separate projects, trans-
verse use cases are proposed as a means of addressing these risks.
These use-cases are independent scenarios that are developed around
a common cyber-physical system platform, and are intended to
build synergy and enable unencumbered demonstration and shar-
ing of research across the chair, as well as to the wider commu-
nity. The ambition is to build innovative prototypes that span the
research projects, while being fail-fast, so as to avoid the sunk-cost-
fallacy, as needs be. We consider transverse use-cases in the spirit
of Jackson [5, 10]: how do we construct an appealing and though-
provoking cyber physical system scenario in order to explain and
further investigate our research?
4 SCIENCE HACKATHONS FOR SECURITY
A science hackathon provides a means to develop transverse use-
cases, where researchers come together to explain ongoing research,
work on requirements, learn and teach each other about relevant
technology and develop rapid prototypes. In the following we de-
scribe the process that was developed. Our approach focussed on
collegiality and exploration, as opposed to the development-centric
and competitive focus of contemporary hackathons.
The science hackathon runs across three separate events, as
depicted in Figure 1. A 2-hour brainstorming session develops a
strawman proposal based on a potential target CPS platform. A
one-day requirements jam considers this proposal, and develops a
shared understanding of platform requirements, which are, in turn,
developed and implemented at a 2-day prototyping hackathon.
Figure 1: The three stages of the science hackathon
Brainstorming. Following an introduction to the goals of the
hackathon, participants spend two hours brainstorming on the
available CPS platforms and consider how a platform might form
the basis of common scenarios interpreted from their individual
research projects. The brainstorming session concludes with a short
presentation and discussion of a strawman proposal. After the brain-
storming session, a short (2 page) proposal document is prepared
collaboratively online and circulated for consultation and feedback.
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Requirements Jam. The objective of the one-day requirements
jam is to develop shared understanding of the technical require-
ments for the platform to be developed and how research questions
from individual research projects can be cast in this platform. One
week prior to the jam, each participant reviews the strawman pro-
posal and develops a (5 minute) presentation slide with their initial
answers to three questions:
Threat scenario. What is the threat (related to your research
project) that you are focusing on, how do you plan on support-
ing it in the CPS testbed, and is your approach innovative?
Technology challenges. What technical development will be
needed on the CPS testbed to implement the scenario? Are there
potential obstacles? Can your scenario be implemented with
minimal (re-)coding of the target (preferable)?
Research challenge. How does this relate to the research ques-
tions on your own project? Will the platform development
leverage/enable your research work (preferable)?
Each participant uses this to pitch how their work can contribute
to the overall scenario. Pitches are debated, scenarios are synthe-
sized, revised and/or eliminated, and presented and discussed with
partners and investigators at the end of the requirements jam.
Following the requirements jam, a requirements document detail-
ing the CPS threat scenario is prepared and circulated for feedback.
This is a synthesis of the individual threats identified by partici-
pants and cast as a unified scenario for the testbed. Additionally,
the document identifies required CPS technologies and develop-
ment, and the research (project) challenges it is envisaged that
the platform will support. The document prioritizes tasks to be
carried out, whereby tasks with lower priority can be dropped dur-
ing prototyping if necessary due to time constraints or feasibility
concerns
Prototyping hackathon. The requirements document provides
a tentative roadmap for the two day prototyping hackathon. Im-
promptu groups formed around the requirements, solving problems
as they arose. Studies have shown that anticipation of having to pre-
pare and give presentations can interfere with the technical focus of
participants in a hackathon [16]. Therefore, since the primary objec-
tive was to produce technical artifacts for the transverse use-case,
a programme of presentations was avoided and the two-days con-
cluded with a short and informal debriefing session. Documentation
and presentations of the results were left for after the hackathon.
5 CASE STUDY
A science hackathon was conducted during the first half of 2018,
following the three stages described in the previous section. The
brainstorming session (February) identified a Fischertechnik-based
CPS testbed as the basis for the strawman scenario. Over the course
of the requirements jam (May) and the prototype hackathon (June),
the testbed was adapted to be consistent with project research
questions. Seven doctoral researchers from seven different projects
participated, along with one research engineer who provided do-
main expertise on the testbed. One Principal Investigator facilitated
the process and an Applied Psychologist conducted a study of the
experiences of the participants. This section gives an overview of
the transverse use-case that was developed.
5.1 A Fischertechnik-based CPS testbed
The testbed used for the hackathon reproduces, at a small scale,
how modern industrial control systems are connected to a orga-
nization’s IT network, as depicted in Figure 2. A virtualized IT
network with two VM border routers isolate the network from
the Internet and the production network, and two VMs provide a
supervision system and an administration system, to control and
monitor the PLCs which drive the production line, respectively.
A production network connects production line PLCs. Network-
enabled Crouzet PLCs support modbus requests from virtualised
supervision/administration workstations. An industrial firewall
supporting modbus and S7, is configured to enable modbus com-
munications between the PLCs and the supervision and administra-
tion workstations. Custom grafcet programs provide automation
for the Fischertechnik platform, a machining production system
with conveyor belts, DC motors, a pneumatic press, a drill, a mill, a
robotic arm which manipulates the processed parts and assorted
mechanical and optical sensors. Parts to be processed move from
one machining tool to the next, using conveyor belts, pistons and
motors. The processed parts are plastic cylinders that are moved by
the robotic arm from the end of the line to the beginning so that the
process run continuously, as required, without human intervention.
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Figure 2: Fischertechnik CPS architecture
5.2 Threat scenario
The requirements jam storyboarded a threat scenario that framed
research questions from different projects. It comprised an external
attacker exploiting weaknesses in the network perimeter defences
and/or an internal attacker with direct access to IT or OT compo-
nents. The attacker has two objectives: (1) stop a conveyor-belt or
release the clamp to halt the production line (easily noticed), or (2)
change milling/drilling times in order to reduce finished product
quality (more subtle). Both objectives require the attacker to send
Modbus packets to at least one Crouzet PLC situated in the OT part
of the organization. As only a specialized insider could physically
access OT, other attackers need to take control at the OT adminis-
tration workstation. Two attack vectors were considered: (1) exploit
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a vulnerability of the workstation or obtain administrator creden-
tials via a dictionary or password-guessing attack, and (2) disable
(physically or remotely) the workstation, forcing administrators to
use a less secure secondary rescue workstation.
5.3 Technology challenges
In implementing the threat scenario, testbed changes were neces-
sary in order to enable researchers deploy their tools and inves-
tigate their research questions. The need for these changes were
identified during the requirements jam, and implemented during
the hackathon, along with other unanticipated changes, as they
emerged. Further switches were added to the production network,
supporting additional hosts, an Intrusion Detection System, net-
work traffic sniffers and hosts to inject network traffic. The PLC
grafcets were modified to expose some of their state variables in
modbus registers. The Fischertechnik platform was extended to
incorporate an interconnection with a second virtualized indus-
trial system, as part of a larger industrial process. In this scenario,
the Fischertechnik platform represents a manufacturing plant that
builds a replacement component upon its failure in the virtualized
industrial system. The state of the virtualized industrial system is
modelled in terms of a collection of PLC/Modbus registers (using
the EasyModbus library), that the SCADA system monitors and
controls the Crouzet PLCs/Fischertechnik platform as appropriate.
Virtualization is a good compromise, in term of resources expended
during the hackathon, and facilitates making, in a realistic way,
more complex scenarios for the research projects that deal with
supervision and system modeling.
This setup of the testbed was used to support the threat scenario
described in section 5.2. The fischertechnik process is triggered on
failure of a component in the virtualized ICS. This could represent
normal wear and tear, or an accident. However, it could also be a
result of an attacker interfering with the production processes, forc-
ing early failure. Such complex situations with interleaved safety
and security call for more advanced diagnosis methods and are
opportunities to illustrate the models developed in the research
challenges the platform was designed for. A secondary workstation
providing backup administration, configured with an old version of
windows with known vulnerabilities, along with weak credentials,
provides the (second) attack vector.
5.4 Research challenges supported by testbed
A primary objective of the science hackathon was to develop a CPS
platform in which research questions from diverse projects could
be demonstrated and explored. By providing distributions for the
probability of component attacks and failures, the model proposed
by Bourget et. al. [2] can be used to provide real-time diagnosis of
security and safety in the testbed. Testbed snapshots of the state of
the PLCs, along with alert events from the IDS enable diagnosis of
the probability of attack/failure as the threat scenario (Section 5.2)
evolves. This can be used to identify the origin of an incident that
generates several alerts, compute probabilities of occurrence of
future events or evaluate the likelihood of any given event. Such
information can be used to decide which is the appropriate response
to the incident. These PLC state snapshots and IDS events are also
used in another project investigating anomaly detection.
During the implementation, a counter-intuitive observation of
the risk model was recognized. The chosen approach was split into
two phases. The first phase consists of recognizing the network as
well as the Modbus registers. The second phase consists of finding
the effective attacks and executing them. Intuitively, the first phase
seems to be easier than the second one. In contrast, the recognition
phase was much more time consuming than the other phase (ac-
cording to our implementation). This kind of information is useful
especially in the context of risk analysis. Indeed, it allows defining
a likelihood of success for each attack (which corresponds to the
risk model) in order to carry out the evaluation of the overall risk.
In fact, this result highlights the importance of the sensitivity anal-
ysis on risk assessment. Moreover, such analysis should take into
consideration assumptions on the risk model.
The testbed is a complex arrangement of hardware and software.
In its design, various mechanisms help enhance its resilience to at-
tack and failure. For example, network virtualization helps provide
defense in depth, while sensor redundancy helps provide fault-
tolerance. We use [3] to model deployments of these mechanisms
in order to determine, and compare, their collective effectiveness at
providing resilience in the testbed. For example, the rescue station
is configured with weak credentials that allow an attacker to make
a dictionary attack. If these credentials are replaced by stronger
ones, how is the overall resilience affected?
Immersive 3D visualization techniques can provide insights into
the security and safety of the system that go beyond the more
conventional mechanisms and techniques [11]. We are using a 3D
virtual environment to simulate testbed configuration, behavior
and security events. This kind of simulation can help us to better
understand the compatibility of our different models (diagnosis,
source and path information, resilience) and to visualize the threat
scenarios in a more graphical and interactive way.
6 EXPERIENCE OF THE HACKATHON
“If someone told us, do that, it wouldn’t be a
hackathon.” [Interview extract]
The evaluation aimed to understand team member experience
of the science hackathon, with a view to applying insights gained
to improve the process in future events. It was decided to conduct
semi-structured interviews with individual team members during
the second day of the prototype hackathon while the team were
still working together. An interview schedule was developed in
conjunction with the organiser of the event. Thematic Analysis
[15] was applied to the audio recordings. Individual recordings were
summarised as transcribed text, emerging themes were identified,
and structured the analysis. Transcribed material was anonymised
and deidentified, and short verbatim extracts used to illustrate the
analysis [13].
An ethical self evaluation was completed. The process of consent
was initiated with participants via email, providing team members
with information on the proposed evaluation. This was followed by
a second email, with an information sheet on method and consent
form, for consideration. The proposed data collection was explained
verbally to participants on Day 1 of Stage 3; as was informed con-
sent, such as anonymity and that there was no onus to participate.
This was an opportunity for questions from the team; questions
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and comments were also invited prior to, and following, individual
interviews. A consent form was signed prior to each interview by
both researcher and participant, and each retains a copy. The forms
retained by the researcher are held securely. The interview data
comprises a total of 141 minutes, with interview duration ranging
from 15 to 30 minutes, with an average of 20 minutes. Themes that
emerged from the analysis are discussed below.
6.1 A process for hacking scientific research
Expectations. The nature of science hackathon, as being a scien-
tific collaboration, had been clear in the information circulated at
the outset, and this was reflected in the expectations of the partici-
pants, as expressed by the comment: “I asked colleagues, and they
said a hackathon was when you program all day, but the scientific
hackathon was explained by Simon, so I understood that it was not
about creating a product, but to work with and talk to other people”.
Requirements Jam. The preparatory work required for the jam
was reported as not being specific enough, in terms of substance
and purpose. For instance, some thought that the questions for the
pitch were too broad, and were unsure if their response was as
expected. However, when the pitch slides from individual partic-
ipants were shown at the second meeting, the usefulness of the
requirements jam was clear. The preparatory work was seen as
an opportunity to clarify individual participation, one participant
comments that “......we had to prepare this part and to write it down,
we didn’t use it much here, but writing it down made it clearer to us,
in our heads”. This was in terms of illustrating the different research
perspectives on the same issues, and the identification of shared
goals. In another participant’s words, “we can work together in a
holistic way, individuals can do parts, then blend”.
The extended time frame. For the team, being together over a
longer time frame than usual facilitated cohesion, both profession-
ally and socially. This is illustrated by the remark: “Usually we have
one day meetings, and you cannot talk with people a lot about the
work, and the hackathon gives the chance, there is more time to talk to
people about their work, about my work, and also not in a professional
way, so that is good”.
6.2 Transverse use-case: avoiding research silos
Linking research strands. Participants talked about the collabora-
tive aspect of the hackathon as being interesting, creative, enjoyable
and useful. Working with, and learning from, others who have dif-
ferent perspectives and expertise in Cyber Security was engaging.
Furthermore, interaction sparked creativity as illustrated by the
following comment: “It gives me ideas, working with everybody, and
we produce stuff that we can use for their work, for my work, so I
am very pleased”. A benefit for research in the Chair flowing from
the opportunity to link disparate research strands was reported, as
illustrated by the following: “Interesting to find out about the diverse
knowledge that each PhD student has, for example, good at hacking,
good at graphing [PLC grafcets]. We have different knowledge, and
put together, can create a different point of view, and explain bet-
ter what they are doing in the Chair.” As the above illustrates, the
process of collaboration and making links was something that the
individual researchers appreciated and valued.
Positioning individual research projects. While one goal of the
hackathon was to foster collaboration in the Chair, additional prac-
tical and conceptual benefits were identified for participants’ indi-
vidual work. For instance, being able to develop a practical scenario
for their own research, exemplified by the following comments:
“What I wanted was to get an opportunity for a realistic scenario [for
my research], and we did it yesterday, so that worked for me” and
also “the platform is the best way to show people your work and aims.”
The conceptual benefit for individual PhD research is the reciprocal
input into each others’ research, helping to clarify PhD research, as
illustrated by this comment: “Being in the same room for two days
and chatting, helped me to think about what I will put in my PhD.”
The function of the transverse use-case. Participants saw the plat-
form as being a useful resource to demonstrate and explain their
own, and others’, research, and the possibilities it entails. For some,
the potential use of the CPS platform is in communicating the
meaning of an attack, and its significance. For instance, being able
to demonstrate an attack to non-technical people is useful, as the
following illustrates: “It’s very interesting to use [the CPS platform],
because we can see the attack, we were able to run some stuff on the
platform, we started an attack and the platform started moving the
wrong way, interesting stuff, and for people that can’t understand the
technical stuff, seeing the platform moving the wrong way, it’s very
understandable, and you can say, that is the attack.”
6.3 CPS platform as a communication resource
Conscious of their role as researchers working with industrial part-
ners in the Chair, the participants envisage the platform as a means
of facilitating communication to those industrial partners. For exam-
ple, one participant talked about how they had not previously been
successful making convincing prototypes, while at the hackathon,
they succeeded with one simple attack scenario. Also, being able
to convey to industrial partners what is possible and feasible from
a research point of view can be challenging for participants. An
example is communicating both the diversity and the broad scope
of Cyber Security and, therefore, how the expertise of an individual
is limited within the breadth of the domain.
Using the platform, and ideas from the hackathon, for communi-
cation with industrial partners is envisaged as being a reciprocal
process. As such, having feedback is important to the participants,
as the following explains: “Having an industrial partner involved
would be good, especially for feedback.” The hackathon is seen as a
way of linking research to the real world. The CPS platform, and
how it was used in the hackathon, are seen as a means of improving
communication between researchers and industrial partners.
6.4 Autonomous collaboration
When asked a general question about what was the best part of
the hackathon, participants responses focussed on the enjoyment
of working in a team, and being challenged, while not under pres-
sure to produce a integrated end-to-end artifact, as such. As PhD
researchers generally working on their own within a supervisory
framework, the hackathon provided an opportunity for them to be
able to interact with peers, to be curious about others’ work, and to
learn about it, even if not understanding everything. The following
comment exemplifies the sense of pleasure of the team work:
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“I enjoyed the challenge of the hackathon, as Simon presented it,
having to mix all the work, very interesting for me, the discussions
were very interesting, I started the hackathon with great enthusi-
asm because of the idea of the scientific hackathon, I wanted to do
something, talk with others, work in a group, because in a PhD you
don’t work with colleagues, so it was very interesting to work on the
hackathon, new ideas, why not?”
The freedom that the unstructured nature of the prototyping
hackathon facilitated was a very positive aspect of the experience.
The lack of pressure to produce a specific deliverable meant that the
team felt able to try ideas and discard them quickly. The following
extract from one interview explains this:
“Thought it might be managed, and it wasn’t, which is good, given
an area to play, we felt free to do the best we could do, we didn’t have
a specific aim to reach, so whether it’s a success or a small success, we
don’t feel much pressure about it, we feel free to try to things, if they
work, good, if they don’t work, try something else, this is good.”
7 CONCLUSION
This paper described how a science hackathon, centred around
testbed platform development, can be used to investigate security
scenarios that reflect the diversity and complexity of real-life cyber-
physical systems in the research questions that they address. Unlike
a conventional hackathon/Capture the Flag event, the activity was
coordinated across time-bounded collaborative events: brainstorm-
ing, requirements jam and prototype hackathon. Driven primarily
by the PhD students, the autonomous and non-competitive nature
of the event was beneficial, an observation consistent with other
studies of time-bounded collaborative events [6, 16]. Ameliorat-
ing the risk of siloing research was also addressed effectively, as
the transverse use case provides a broader context in which to
understand and relate individual research challenges.
The testbed platform, and what was developed in the hackathon,
was conceptualised as a means of communicating with others about
research, such as industrial partners, and those with less technical
domain expertise. As such, its role in improving communication is
envisaged as being bidirectional, with the suggestion from partic-
ipants that it could be useful as a way, not alone to explain their
research, but also as a way for industrial partners to provide feed-
back on that research. This finding is a good use of the testbed, one
of the main goals of the event.
Remedying the uncertainty expressed by participants around
their expectations for the hackathon highlights an interesting area
of tension. With a conventional hackathon, expectations are gener-
ally well understood: attack or defend. However, expectations are
less certain in a science hackathon, as was evident in interviews.
While introducing more organization may help provide clarity, it
can work against innovation [6]. This motivated the requirements
jam as a means to help set expectations, while encouraging au-
tonomous collaboration. While being broad in its questions to the
extent that individuals were initially somewhat unsure about how
to respond, the jam did, nevertheless, provide clarity to individuals
on the potential for them to contribute. As such, this was a valuable
learning experience for participants, providing an opportunity to
develop a sense of their own research in relation to that of others;
how collaboration could work as a process, as well as for future
research. Related to this is the uncertainty around the degree of
the expected outcome, specifically, whether the conceptual collabo-
rative work was required to culminate in a functioning artifact in
order for the hackathon to be deemed a success. While providing
additional guidance and direction, other than the level of advice
that was given, would have removed some of the uncertainty ex-
perienced, it may have done so at the expense of the independent
learning gained in this collaborative context. How best to achieve
the best balance in this area of tension is an area for future research.
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